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HOW THE HOLDING IN DENT V. NATIONAL
FOOTBALL LEAGUE TACKLES COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
Nairi Dulgarian
In 2014, a group of retired professional football players sued the National Football League (“NFL”), claiming that the league distributed controlled substances and prescription drugs to them in violation of state and
federal laws. The trial court ruled that the players’ state law claims are
preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(“LMRA”), and that the players should instead follow the arbitration procedures set out in the agreed upon collective bargaining agreement. However,
the Ninth Circuit reversed the NFL’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that
the players’ claims are not preempted by section 301. Ultimately, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling in Dent v. National Football League may
place the liability of caring for the health and safety of players directly on
the NFL itself rather than individual teams. This essentially ignores the policies set out in the collective bargaining agreement.
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit erroneously reversed the
trial court’s ruling, because the claims brought against the NFL by the retired
professional football players should be preempted by section 301 of the
LMRA. Furthermore, this Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision
interferes with the uniformity of interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements. For this reason, the ruling is unfair to not only the league, but
to other organizations and companies who also rely on collective bargaining
to negotiate with employees.
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INTRODUCTION

In the blink of an eye, New England Patriots’ wide receiver Julian Edelman saw his season end before it even began. In a preseason game against
the Detroit Lions on August 25, 2017, Edelman injured his knee after he
planted his foot awkwardly and his leg buckled.1 An MRI later confirmed
that he tore the ACL in his right knee and would miss the entire 2017-2018
season.2 After having knee surgery shortly thereafter, Edelman, together
with the Patriots’ team doctors and trainers, began a grueling rehabilitation
that lasted close to a year.3 His recovery was successful and he returned to
the field injury free for the start of the 2018-2019 season.4
For many professional athletes in the United States, however, injuries
are not properly dealt with. More often than not, professional athletes are
left with permanent physical and mental damage after their injuries are either
improperly treated or go untreated altogether, and are all but forced to resort
to the courts to resolve these largely avoidable outcomes.5 This was the case
for Richard Dent (“Dent”) and nine other former football players (collectively the “Plaintiffs”) who brought suit against the National Football League
(“NFL”) in 2014 based on injuries they suffered while playing.6 Unlike
Edelman, who received extensive medical care for his injury, Dent and the

1. Jim McBride, Julian Edelman Out for the Season with Knee Injury, BOSTON GLOBE
(Aug. 26, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/patriots/2017/08/26/patriots-julian-edelman-acl-tear-right-knee/NwPwh43JZ8ULYsdexq3tLM/story.html
[https://perma.cc/6RJGA7RE].
2. Id.
3. Hayden Bird, What Julian Edelman Had to Say About Coming Back from His 2017 Knee
Injury, BOSTON.COM (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.boston.com/sports/new-england-patriots/2018/08/03/julian-edelman-injury-rehab-update-2018 [http://archive.is/wx1DL].
4. Henry McKenna, Julian Edelman After Returning from ACL Injury: ‘I Feel Like I’m the
Best
Me’, PATRIOTSWIRE (Oct.
5,
2018,
6:30
AM), https://patriotswire.usatoday.com/2018/10/05/julian-edelman-after-returning-from-aclinjury-i-feel-like-im-the-best-me/ [https://perma.cc/A2CL-E9RM].
5. Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014 WL 7205048, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 17, 2014).
6. Id.
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Plaintiffs allege that they were given medications without prescriptions and
were rushed back to the field before their injuries properly healed.7
Founded in 1920 as the American Professional Football Association,
the NFL is an unincorporated association of member clubs that consists of
thirty-two teams spread out over two conferences.8 Like other professional
sports, football is a tough, and at times, dangerous sport that can cause injuries. In order to stay at the top of their game, professional athletes need to
take good care of their bodies. At the same time, properly taking care of
injuries is a necessity that not only needs to be addressed by the athletes
themselves, it must also be a priority for the NFL and other professional
sports leagues.
The NFL has addressed injury related concerns by imposing duties on
teams in its collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). While the NFL “promotes, organizes, and regulates professional football in the United States,”
players enter into agreements with individual teams, not the NFL itself.9 In
effect, players are considered employees of the individual teams rather than
the NFL,10 and the CBA places the responsibility of caring for the health and
safety of players on the teams and team owners.11 However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling in Dent v. National Football League, (“Dent v.
NFL” or “Dent”), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made a decision that
may potentially place the burden directly on the NFL—and other organizations and companies bound by a CBA—effectively ignoring the policies and
procedures stated in the CBA.12
On May 20, 2014, Dent and the Plaintiffs filed a putative class action
suit against the NFL in the Northern District of California alleging that “since
1969, the NFL has distributed controlled substances and prescription drugs

7. Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014 WL 7205048, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 17, 2014).
8. Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 2009); National Football
League, ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-FootballLeague [https://perma.cc/SQZ8-U5ST].
9. Williams, 582 F.3d at 868.
10. Dent v. Nat’l Football League, 902 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2018).
11. Dent, 2014 WL 7205048, at *4.
12. See generally Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014 WL
7205048, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014).
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to its players in violation of both state and federal laws.”13 The main issue
the court considered was whether the state-law claims against the NFL were
preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(“LMRA”).14 The trial court ruled in favor of the NFL and dismissed the
case.15 However, after the players appealed the trial court’s decision, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the NFL’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
players’ claims are not preempted by section 301.16
This article argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in reversing the trial
court’s ruling dismissing the players’ case because the claims brought
against the NFL by former professional football players are, in fact,
preempted by section 301 of the LMRA. If the Ninth Circuit’s decision is
upheld by the United States Supreme Court, provisions in a CBA may be
rendered useless and employers, such as the NFL, who rely on CBAs to conduct their operations will have trouble enforcing its policies. Part II of this
Comment discusses the background of the LMRA and explains preemption
under section 301. That section also explores the intricacies of the NFL’s
CBA. Part III discusses the facts and procedural history of Dent. Part IV
provides an analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, explains why the court
was incorrect in reversing the decision of the trial court, and provides a possible solution for the players should the Supreme Court reverse the decision
of the Ninth Circuit in favor of the NFL. Finally, Part V concludes the article
by acknowledging the concerns that players have for their health, while recognizing that section 301 preempts state-law claims that players brought in
retaliation to the injuries they suffered.

13. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1114–15.
14. Dent, 2014 WL 7205048, at *1.
15. See generally id.
16. See generally Dent, 902 F.3d 1109.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. History of Federal Labor Legislation and Collective Bargaining
in the United States, and the Enactment of the LMRA
Beginning in the 1930s, the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)
governed labor laws in the United States.17 As a result of the economic and
social consequences of the Great Depression in the 1930s, newly elected
president Franklin D. Roosevelt introduced a plethora of new government
programs, including unemployment insurance, job creation, social security,
and the minimum wage, to help Americans deal with the hardships that many
people faced during this difficult time.18 This series of government programs
became known as “The New Deal.”19
One critical part of Roosevelt’s programs under the New Deal was the
enactment of the NLRA in 1935.20 The NLRA was the first major piece of
U.S. labor legislation that gave workers the right to organize, join labor unions, collectively bargain through representatives of their choosing, and
strike.21 In recognition of the lack of employees’ rights and the exploitation
of employees by employers, the NLRA “was designed to provide [workers]
with protection in urging [their] complaints, and to require the employer to
listen to them and to try fairly to find a mutually acceptable basis for their
correction. . . .”22
“The NLRA encouraged collective bargaining and gave employees the
right to organize themselves into unions by “[setting] standards for union
elections, and . . . [specifying] unfair labor practices of employers.”23 Its

17. HARRY C. KATZ, THOMAS A. KOCHAN & ALEXANDER J. S. COLVIN, AN
INTRODUCTION TO U.S. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR RELATIONS 40 (Cornell University
Press, ILR Press 2017).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Edwin A. Elliott, The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 SW. SOC. SCIENCE
Q. 107, 109 (1948).
23. Id. at 40.
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enactment also indicated “a turn towards collective bargaining as the preferred method for labor and management”24, allowed workers to form labor
unions, and required employers to negotiate wages, hours, and working conditions with the unions.25 This provision of the NLRA allowing employees
to form labor unions was expanded with the enactment of the LMRA, which
also gave employees the “right to refrain from [organizing and forming labor
unions] except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment.”26
The LMRA was enacted by Congress on June 23, 1947 to “demobilize
the labor movement by imposing limits on the ability to strike.”27 The purpose of the LMRA was “to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees
and employers in their relations. . .[and] to protect the rights of individual
employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect
commerce.”28 Additionally, the LMRA “weakened unions and increased the
employers’ powers to resist organization and collective bargaining”29 by including “a series of prohibited union unfair labor practices, an expansion of
employer ‘free speech’ rights, and a provision for the use of injunctions
against strikes that imperiled national health and safety.”30
Overall, the policy of LMRA rests on the assumptions that “[i]ndustrial
strife. . .can be avoided. . .if employers, employees, and labor organizations
each recognize under law [] one another’s legitimate rights in their relations
with each other. . . .”31

24. Id.
25. Id. at 42.
26. Id.
27. Morgan Francy, An Open Field for Professional Athlete Litigation: An Analysis of the
Current Application of Section 301 Preemption in Professional Sports Lawsuits, 70 SMU L. REV.
475, 479 (2017).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. JAMES A. GROSS, RIGHTS, NOT INTERESTS: RESOLVING VALUE CLASHES UNDER THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 25 (Cornell University Press, 2017).
31. Richard Powers, The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947: A Topical Digest, 15.1
S. ECON. J. 67, 67 (1948).
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B. Section 301 Preemption Under the LMRA
Collective bargaining agreements typically prevent employees from
bringing certain tort and contract claims against their employers based on
section 301 of the LMRA. Section 301 states that “[s]uits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.”32
The policy behind preemption under section 301 is to encourage “uniformity
of interpretation of collective bargaining agreements and prevention of interference with those agreements[,]”33 as well as “to promote the peaceable,
consistent resolution of labor-management disputes.”34
Preemption under the LMRA is different from preemption under the
Constitution of the United States because “it is not driven by substantive
conflicts in law.”35 Under Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution, the laws
of the United States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”36
Based on this clause, “courts have long recognized that state laws that conflict with federal law are ‘without effect.’”37 Therefore, under Article VI,
Clause 2 of the Constitution, any state-law claim is “preempted” if it conflicts with a federal law. LMRA preemption instead is “grounded in the need
to protect the proper forum for resolving certain kinds of disputes and, by
extension, the substantive law applied thereto.”38
While “Congress has declined to explicitly state whether it intended for
[section] 301 to preempt state-law claims,” section 301 “has long been interpreted as ousting state-law claims for breach of contract when the contract

32. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006).
33. Francy, supra note 27, at 479.
34. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 404 (1988).
35. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 922 (9th Cir. 2018).
36. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
37. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008).
38. Alaska Airlines Inc., 898 F.3d at 943.
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involved is a collective bargaining agreement.”39 Additionally, “[w]hen resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the
terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that
claim must either be treated as a [section] 301 claim or dismissed as
preempted by federal labor-contract law.”40 However, in Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., the court emphasized that section 301 does not
grant the parties to a CBA the ability to contract for illegal activities.41
In addition to the preemption for breach of contract claims, the court in
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (“Lueck”) discussed section 301 preemption
of tort-law claims. In Lueck, the court explained how “the preemptive effect
of [section] 301 must extend beyond suits alleging contract violations[,]” and
that “questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and
what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether such
questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort.”42 The court explained that if this were not the case,
parties would avoid the requirements of section 301 by claiming that their
breach of contract claims are claims for tort-law claims.43

1. The Test for Section 301 Preemption
Lower courts have created the following two-step test to define
preemption under section 301. First, does the cause of action involve “rights
conferred upon an employee by virtue of state-law [and] not by a CBA?”44
If these rights “exist solely as a result of the CBA, then the claim is

39. Kelly A. Heard, The Impact of Preemption in the NFL Concussion Litigation, 68 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 221, 227 (2013).
40. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985).
41. Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 695 (9th Cir. 2001).
42. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 210–11.
43. Id.
44. Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007).
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preempted, and [the] analysis ends there.”45 However, if the right exists independently of the CBA, the question becomes whether it is “substantially
dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.”46
To determine whether a claim requires interpretation of a CBA, a
“case-by-case analysis of the state-law claim as it relates to the CBA” is required.47 Additionally, those claims “must be analyzed as they relate to the
CBAs under which the Players played.’”48 As the court in Dent explained:
If the plaintiff’s claim cannot be resolved without interpreting the
applicable CBA . . . it is preempted. Alternatively, if the claim
may be litigated without reference to the rights and duties established in a CBA . . . it is not preempted. The plaintiff’s claim is
the touchstone for this analysis; the need to interpret the CBA
must inhere in the nature of the plaintiff’s claim . . . A state-law
claim is not preempted under [Section] 301 unless it necessarily
requires the court to interpret an existing provision of a CBA that
can reasonably be said to be relevant to the resolution of the dispute.49
A defendant cannot invoke preemption “simply because the defendant
refers to the CBA in mounting a defense,”50 and a preemption argument is
not credible “simply because the court may have to consult the CBA to evaluate.”51 To prevail on a defense of preemption, “the proffered interpretation
argument must reach a reasonable level of credibility.”52 Generally, if the
plaintiffs use this two-step test to prove that their state-law claims should be
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Michael Telis, Playing Through the Haze: The NFL Concussion Litigation and Section
301 Preemption, 102 GEO. L.J. 1841, 1855 (2014).
48. Id.
49. Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014 WL 7205048, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 17, 2014).
50. Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691.
51. Id. at 692.
52. Id.
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preempted, then the “claims will be dismissed and must be pursued through
the grievance procedure set out in the controlling CBA . . . .”53

2. Significant Cases Prior to Dent v. NFL
Recent cases similar to Dent demonstrate how section 301 has been
interpreted by lower courts. As the outcomes of the following cases and the
broadness of the test indicate, preemption under section 301 has been applied
several times in cases involving the NFL or NFL teams. Courts have encouraged preemption,54 as all but two of these recent cases have favored it
and concluded that plaintiffs must adhere to the provisions set in the CBA.

a. Evans v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club
In Evans v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club (“Evans”), the plaintiffs,
retired NFL players sued the thirty-two individual NFL teams, rather than
the NFL itself, challenging the administration of painkiller drugs.55 The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims against them are
preempted by section 301 and barred by the statute of limitations because the
thirteen named plaintiffs were retired.56 Moreover, the plaintiffs allege that
the teams made intentional misrepresentations to them in violation of the
Controlled Substances Act and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.57 However, a CBA cannot sanction the illegal distribution of medications in violation of these statutes.58 Therefore, the terms of the CBA need not be construed and the “prohibition against such conduct stood independently from
any CBA.”59

53. Francy, supra note 27, at 477–78.
54. Cramer, 255 F.3d at 690.
55. Evans v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club, LLC, No. CV WMN-15-1457, 2016 WL
759208, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 25, 2016); Evans v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC, No. C 1601030 WHA, 2016 WL 3566945, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2016).
56. Id. at *1.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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Because the claims were directed at the individual teams, the court concluded that the claims for relief were grounded in illegal conduct in the
teams’ violation of state statutes, and denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss.60 Although the players retired years before filing the lawsuit, the
teams’ motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations was denied because “the nature of at least some of the injuries was latent and slow in developing.”61

b.

Duerson v. National Football League, Inc.

Duerson v. National Football League, Inc. (“Duerson”) was about David Duerson, an NFL player for ten years who later committed suicide.62
Three months after his suicide, doctors examined his brain and he was diagnosed with chronic traumatic encephalopathy.63 Duerson’s estate sued the
NFL in state court for wrongful death, alleging that Duerson’s suicide was a
result of the brain damage he suffered while playing in the NFL.64 The NFL
sought to remove the case to federal court, arguing that the state-law wrongful death claim was preempted by section 301 because it was “substantially
dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the
parties in a labor contract.”65 The court agreed, stating that it would “need
to determine whether Duerson’s concussive brain trauma was ‘significantly
aggravated,’ within the meaning of the CBA provision, by continuing to
play.”66 Additionally, the court concluded that even though the CBA only
imposed duties on the NFL teams, not the NFL itself, it would have to interpret the CBA to determine whether the NFL’s duty was triggered.67

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Duerson v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., No. 12 C 2513, 2012 WL 1658353, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. May 11, 2012).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at *2.
66. Id. at *4.
67. Id. at *10.
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c. Stringer v. National Football League
In the events leading up to Stringer v. National Football League
(“Stringer”), NFL player Korey Stringer died of heat exhaustion and heatstroke during the preseason.68 As a result, his widow sued (1) the NFL, (2)
the California corporation responsible for approving, licensing, and promoting equipment used by NFL teams, and (3) the Minnesota Vikings’ team
physician in state court for negligence.69 The NFL contended that the CBA,
entered into by the National Football League Management Council and the
National Football League Players Association, is the only logical source of
the duties allegedly breached.70 In addition, the NFL argued that resolution
of the plaintiff’s claims would require interpretation of the terms of the CBA
because the claims present disputes over “working conditions.”71
In response, the plaintiff argued that her claims were not preempted
“because they were based solely on common law tort principles and could
be resolved without interpreting any provisions of the CBA.”72 The court
found that the plaintiff’s claims do not arise from the CBA, yet resolution of
her claim requires interpretation of the terms of the CBA and is intertwined
with it.73
Another significant issue decided in Stringer was whether non-signatories to a CBA can invoke section 301 preemption as a defense to a plaintiff’s state-law claims.74 Citing to several cases, the court found that the
“[d]efendants’ status as non-signatories to the CBA does not prevent them
from raising the preemption defense.”75

68. Stringer v. Nat’l Football League, 474 F. Supp. 2d 894, 898 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 901.
71. Id. at 900–01.
72. Id. at 901.
73. Id. at 908.
74. Id. at 901–02.
75. Id. at 902.
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d. Holmes v. National Football League
In Holmes v. National Football League (“Holmes”), an NFL player was
suspended for four games after he tested positive for a drug test given to him
by the Detroit Lions pursuant to the NFL’s drug testing program established
by the CBA.76 The player sued, alleging that the imposed punishment mandated by the NFL CBA violated his due process rights.77 The court held that
the labor dispute regarding the propriety of Holmes’ enrollment in the drug
program could not be separated from his state tort and contract claims, and
the claims were preempted by the LMRA.78

e. Williams v. National Football League
In Williams v. National Football League (“Williams”), several football
players sued the NFL for fraud, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation
after they were suspended for testing positive for a banned substance found
in the dietary supplements they took.79 The players argued that the NFL had
duty, separate from the CBA, to provide the players “[an] ingredient-specific
warning” for the dietary supplements.80
The court concluded that “whether the NFL . . . owed the Players a duty
to provide such a warning cannot be determined without examining the parties’ legal relationship and expectations as established by the CBA and the
[collectively bargained NFL Policy on Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances].”81 This prevents NFL players from using certain substances and
“adopts a rule of strict liability under which ‘[p]layers are responsible for
what is in their bodies.’’’82 Therefore, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the
players’ claims for fraud, constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation were preempted by section 301 because the claims “relating to what the

76. Holmes v. Nat’l Football League, 939 F. Supp. 517, 520 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
77. Id. at 522.
78. Id. at 527.
79. Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 880–81 (8th Cir. 2009).
80. Id. at 881.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 868.
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parties to a labor agreement agreed. . .must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law.”83 However, they also concluded that the players’ claims
under the Minnesota Consumable Products Act and the Minnesota Drug and
Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act were not preempted by the LMRA
because they did not require interpreting and applying the provisions of the
NFL’s drug testing program.84

C. The NFL’s Collective Bargaining Agreements
The NLRA states that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”85 Additionally, Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA prohibits employers
from refusing to engage in collective bargaining with employee representatives,86 ensuring that employers negotiate in good faith.87
Since 1968, the NFL, its individual teams, and NFL players have been
bound by a series of CBAs.88 The current CBA went into effect on August
4, 2011, and extends through 2020.89 The NFL is not a party to this CBA;
instead, it is negotiated by the NFL Players Association (“NFLPA”) (the
players’ bargaining unit) and the NFL Management Council (the teams’ bargaining unit).90
83. Id.
84. Id. at 878.
85. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 452 § 7 (1935).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
87. Noel M.B. Hensley & John V. Jansonius, The Interaction of Federal Labor and Antitrust Policies: An Analysis of the Legality of Coordinated Collective Bargaining by Employers, 40
SW. L.J. 967, 973 (1986).
88. Francy, supra note 27, at 482.
89. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the NFL Management Council and the NFL
Players Association, NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION 1, 1 (Aug. 4, 2011),
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/2011%20CBA%20Updated%20with%20Side%20Letters%20thru%201-5-15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8UXP-PK8K].
90. Dent v. Nat’l Football League, 902 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2018).
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Before CBAs governed professional sports, team owners insisted that
players were not employees, and therefore were not protected under the
NLRA.91 However, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), created
when Congress passed the NLRA in 1935, changed this, which lead to labor
disputes between players and owners in professional sports leagues, including the NFL.92 In 1956, the NFLPA was created, but despite its existence, a
CBA was not actually in place between the players and owners.93 Instead,
some players resorted to hiring their own agents to negotiate contractual
terms and provisions.94 The first CBA was agreed upon in 1968,95 after the
merger of the NFL and the American Football League.96 Since then, CBAs
have changed and developed over time, with negotiations continuing to be
held between the NFLPA and the NFL Management Council.
In regard to players’ health, CBAs have included provisions concerning
players’ rights to medical care and treatment since 1982.97 Generally, these
provisions have required teams to employ “a board-certified orthopedic surgeon as one of its club physicians,” and that “all other physicians retained by
a Club to treat players shall be board-certified in their field of medical expertise.”98 In addition, players are “guaranteed . . . the right to access their
medical records, obtain second opinions, and choose their own surgeons.”99

91. Michael Lydakis & Andrew Zapata, Tackling the Issues: The History of the National
Football League’s 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement and What it Means for the Future of the
Sport, 10 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 17, 17–18 (2012).
92. Id. at 18.
93. C. P. Goplerud III, Collective Bargaining in the National Football League: A Historical
and Comparative Analysis, 4 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 13, 14 (1997).
94. Id.
95. Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 91, at 18.
96. Id.
97. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1114.
98. NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 89, at 171.
99. Id.
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There are also several provisions in the CBA that specifically address
player health and safety.100 For example, the 1982 CBA established that “[i]f
a Club physician advise[s] a coach or other Club representative of a player’s
physical condition which could adversely affect the player’s performance or
health, the physician [shall] also advise the player.”101 In addition, the 1993
CBA added the requirement that “[i]f such condition could be significantly
aggravated by continued performance, the physician [shall] advise the player
of such fact in writing.”102 Finally, the 2011 CBA established that team physicians “are required to disclose to a player any and all information about the
player’s physical condition” that the physicians disclose to coaches or other
team representatives, “whether or not such information affects the player’s
performance or health.’”103

III. DENT V. NFL LAWSUIT
A. Factual and Procedural Background
On May 20, 2014, Dent and Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the Northern
District of California against the NFL, seeking class action status for more
than 1,000 former players who received narcotic painkillers, anti-inflammatories, local anesthetics, sleeping aids, or other drugs without prescription,
independent diagnosis, or warnings about the side effects and dangers of
mixing with other drugs.104 They contend that the way the drugs were distributed left them with severe, long-term injuries.105 The plaintiffs asserted
nine claims: (1) declaratory relief, (2) medical monitoring, (3) fraud, (4)
fraudulent concealment, (5) negligent misrepresentation, (6) negligence per
se, (7) loss of consortium on behalf of class members’ spouses, (8) negligent

100. Kelly A. Heard, The Impact of Preemption in the NFL Concussion Litigation, 68 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 221, 235 (2013).
101. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1114.
102. Id.
103. NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 89, at 175.
104. Dent v. Nat’l Football League, 902 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2018); Ex-Players: NFL
Illegally Used Drugs, ESPN (May 22, 2014), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/10958191/nflillegally-supplied-risky-painkilling-drugs-former-players-allege-suit
[https://perma.cc/QHK7CMFM].
105. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1115.
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hiring of medical personnel, and (9) negligent retention of medical personnel.106 They sought punitive damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief,
and medical monitoring.107
Plaintiffs allege that since 1969 doctors and trainers from NFL teams
have supplied injured players with different pain medications that allow
them to effectively return to the field rather than allowing them to rest and
heal properly from football-related injuries.108 The medications were given
without prescriptions, without consulting the players’ medical history, and
in ways that violated both federal laws and the American Medical Association’s Code of Ethics.109
Dent is a NFL Hall of Fame defensive player who claims that throughout his fourteen-year career on four different teams, team doctors and trainers gave him “hundreds, if not thousands” of injections and pills that contained painkillers to keep him on the field, rather than allowing his injuries
to heal.110 According to Dent, he was never warned about the potential side
effects or long-term risks of the medications he was given, and he ended his
career with an enlarged heart, permanent nerve damage in his foot, and an
addiction to painkillers.111
Among others, Plaintiffs also include members of the NFL champion
1985 Chicago Bears: Offensive Lineman Keith Van Horne, and Quarterback Jim McMahon.112 Similar to Dent, Horne and McMahon allege that
during their time in the NFL, they were given opioids, non-steroidal antiinflammatory medications, and local anesthetics without prescriptions.113
They also allege that “the NFL encouraged players to take these pain-masking medications to keep players on the field and revenues high, even [though]

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014 WL 7205048, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 17, 2014).
109. Id. at *2.
110. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1114.
111. Id.
112. ESPN, supra note 104.
113. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1115.
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the football season [grew] longer and the time between games [became]
shorter . . . .”114
According to the players, they “rarely, if ever, received written prescriptions. . .for the medications they were receiving,” and instead were
handed pills in “small manila envelopes that often had no directions or labeling” and were told to take whatever was in the envelopes.115 They further
allege that during their years of taking these medications, doctors and trainers never warned them about “potential side effects, long-term risks, interactions with other drugs, or the likelihood of addiction.”116 As a result, the
plaintiffs claim to suffer from permanent orthopedic injuries, drug addictions, heart problems, nerve damage, and renal failure.117

B. Trial Court Rulings
In response to the plaintiffs’ suit, the NFL filed two motions to dismiss.118 First, the NFL argued that the players’ claims are preempted by
section 301 of the LMRA.119 Second, the NFL argued that the players not
only failed to state a claim, but also that their claims were time-barred under
the statute of limitations.120
Following an initial hearing on November 6, 2014, the trial court submitted a series of requests for an additional briefing before granting the
NFL’s motion to dismiss under section 301.121 In doing so, the court outlined
preemption under section 301 following the two-step test described above in
Part II.B. It then explained how the essence of the plaintiffs’ claim of relief

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1114.
118. Dent, 2014 WL 7205048, at *2.
119. Id.
120. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1115–16.
121. Dent, 2014 WL 7205048, at *6.
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is that the “individual clubs mistreated their players and the league was negligent in failing to intervene and stop their alleged mistreatment.”122
While the CBA does not conflict with the common law theories of the
complaint, the court concluded that the players’ state-law claims are
preempted by section 301 because litigating the state-law claim would require interpreting the CBA between the league and the NFLPA.123 The court
came to this conclusion because “it would be necessary to consider the ways
in which the NFL has indeed stepped forward and required proper medical
care–which here prominently included imposing specific CBA medical duties on the clubs.”124 In one set of findings for the preemption of negligencebased claims, the court described several provisions in different CBAs and
the steps the NFL has taken to address the issue of medical care by imposing
duties on individual teams:
As demonstrated by the scope and development of these provisions, this is not a situation in which the NFL has stood by and
done nothing. The union and the league have bargained extensively over the subject of player medical care for decades. While
these protections do not specifically call out the prescribing of
drugs and painkillers, they address more generally medical care,
player health, and recovery time, and proper administration of
drugs can reasonably be deemed to fall under these more general
protections. Put differently, the right to medical care established
by the CBAs, moreover, presumably included and still includes
proper medical care in accordance with professional standards –
including for the administration of drugs and painkillers – or at
least a fair question of interpretation in that regard is posed.125

For example, the plaintiffs’ negligent hiring and negligent retention
claims allege that the NFL “had a duty to ‘hire and retain educationally wellqualified, medically-competent professionally-objective and specifically-

122. Id. at *10–11.
123. Id. at *23.
124. Id.
125. Id. at *19–20.
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trained professionals not subject to any conflicts.’”126 The court explained
how the NFL and NFLPA addressed this duty in the CBA by requiring each
club to hire physicians that are “board-certified in their field of medical expertise.”127
The plaintiffs also argued that because they sued the NFL directly and
did not sue any of the individual teams, team doctors or trainers, “the interpretation of CBA provisions relating to the individual clubs are unnecessary
for resolving the plaintiffs’. . .claims against the league.”128 In response, the
trial court stated that “[t]he nub of plaintiffs’ claims is that the NFL is responsible for, and acts through, the clubs’ medical staffs,” and “[t]o determine what the scope of this supervisory duty was, and whether the NFL
breached it, the Court would need to determine, to repeat, what the NFL,
through the CBAs, required of the individual club and club physicians.”129
Therefore, the court concluded that it would be necessary to interpret the
CBA, and that the plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by section 301.130
The court also concluded that it was necessary to interpret the CBA for
the plaintiffs’ fraud-based claims and claims for declaratory relief, medical
monitoring, and loss of consortium on behalf of the putative class members’
spouses.131 The players timely appealed the trial court’s decision to the Ninth
Circuit, which reversed the trial court’s decision.132

C. Reasoning of the Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit, like the trial court, used the two-step test to determine whether the plaintiff’s state-law claims were preempted by section 301.133 However, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning differed from the trial
court’s interpretation of the players’ claims. The trial court stated that “the
126. Id. at *21.
127. Dent, 2014 WL 7205048, at *16.
128. Id. at *23.
129. Id. at *24.
130. Id. at *39.
131. Dent, 2014 WL 7205048, at *38.
132. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1113–14.
133. Id. at 1116.
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‘essence’ of the plaintiffs’ negligence claim ‘is that the individual clubs mistreated their players and the league was negligent in failing to intervene and
stop their alleged mistreatment.’”134 Unlike the trial court, however, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the players’ claims do not comprise a dispute
over the rights created by the CBA.135 Instead, their claims involve whether
or not the NFL itself, not the individual teams, provided players with prescription drugs.136
Here, the Ninth Circuit concluded that because the players are suing
the NFL and not the individual teams, the players’ claims “do not constitute
a dispute over the rights created by, or the meaning of, the CBAs.”137 Additionally, the court emphasized that “[t]heir claim is that when the NFL provided players with prescription drugs, it engaged in conduct that was completely outside the scope of the CBA[].”138 This is similar to the reasoning
used in Evans, where the court concluded that the claims for relief were
grounded in illegal conduct in violation of statutes by the clubs.139 The Ninth
Circuit contradicted the trial court’s reasoning by claiming that
“the teams’ obligations under the CBA[] are irrelevant to the question of
whether the NFL breached an obligation to players by violating the law.”140
Furthermore, the court held that the fact that the CBA has provisions addressing players’ injuries and medical conditions “does not address
the NFL’s liability for injuring players by illegally distributing prescription
drugs.”141 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit conducted the analysis with this
reasoning in mind.
Therefore, largely because the provisions in the CBA does not directly
address the NFL itself, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “no interpretation of
the terms of the CBA[] is necessary, and there is no danger that a court will
134. Id. at 1118.
135. Id. at 1123.
136. Id.
137. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1126.
138. Id.
139. Evans v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC, No. C 16-01030 WHA, 2016 WL
3566945, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2016).
140. Id. at 1121.
141. Id.
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impermissibly invade the province of the labor arbitrator.”142 In addition,
the court clarified that “[m]erely consulting a CBA…does not constitute ‘interpretation’ of the CBA for preemption purposes.”143 Instead, the court
stated that it should “. . .compare the NFL’s conduct with the requirements
of state and federal laws governing the distribution of prescription drugs.”144

IV. ANALYSIS OF NINTH CIRCUIT’S RULING OF DENT V.
NFL
A. Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling, Federal Preemption of
the Players’ State-Law Claims was Warranted
The Ninth Circuit erroneously reversed the trial court’s decision to
grant the NFL’s motion to dismiss, for two reasons. First, in accordance with
the two-step test described above, the plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by
section 301. Second, the Ninth Circuit’s holding interferes with the uniformity of interpretation of CBAs. For these reasons, the players’ claims
should have been preempted by section 301 and the lower court’s decision
should not have been reversed. Furthermore, if their claims are preempted
by section 301, the plaintiffs still have recourse through the arbitration procedures defined in the CBA.

1. Federal Preemption of the Plaintiffs’ Claims was Warranted
Because They Adhere to the Two-Step Test for Section 301
Preemption
As mentioned above in Part II.B.1, the following questions are asked
when determining whether employees’ claims are preempted by section 301:
first, does the cause of action involve “rights conferred upon an employee by
virtue of state law [and] not by a CBA?”145 If the rights at issue arise from

142. Id. at 1126.
143. Id. at 1117.
144. Id. at 1120.
145. Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007).
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the CBA, then the claim is preempted, and the analysis ends there.146 Second, if the rights do not arise from the CBA, does “litigating the state law
claim nonetheless require interpretation of a CBA?”147 Here, the plaintiffs’
claims should be preempted by section 301 because the claims either arise
from the NFL CBAs, or required the interpretation of them.

a. The Players’ Claims Arise from the CBAs
The first question asks whether the rights at issue arise from the
CBA.148 If the claim at issue is not a relevant issue in the CBA, then it is not
considered to arise from the CBA.149 For example, in McPherson v. Tenn.
Football Inc. (“McPherson”), a player brought a negligence claim against
the Tennessee Titans after he was hit by a mascot in a golf cart during
halftime.150 The court held that the player’s claim was not preempted because there were no provisions in the CBA “concerning its mascots or field
safety for half-time activities.”151 In contrast, the court in Holmes, where an
NFL player was suspended for failing a drug test, concluded that the player’s
claims were preempted by section 301 because the CBA contained a provision with an established drug testing program.152
Here, there are CBA provisions directly applicable to the relevant
claim. Regarding the players’ negligence claims, the Ninth Circuit analyzed
each claim and concluded that “the players’ right to receive medical care
from the NFL that does not create an unreasonable risk of harm” does not
arise from the CBA.153 Unlike the district court, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the players’ claims do not arise from the CBA because the NFL engaged

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Dent v. Nat’l Football League, 902 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2018).
149. Duerson v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., No. 12 C 2513, 2012 WL 1658353, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. May 11, 2012).
150. McPherson v. Tenn. Football Inc., No. 07CV00002, 2007 WL 803970, at *5 (M.D.
Tenn. Jan. 3, 2007); Duerson, 2012 WL 1658353, at *5.
151. Duerson, 2012 WL 1658353, at *5 (citation omitted).
152. Holmes v. Nat’l Football League, 939 F. Supp. 517, 524 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
153. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1118.
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in conduct outside the scope of the CBA.154 However, there are several provisions in the CBA that address player health and safety. Unlike the situation
in McPherson, where the CBA had no relevant provisions regarding mascots
and field safety during halftime,155 current and past CBAs clearly state the
numerous duties that the league has imposed on the individual clubs. For
example, the 1980 CBA imposed a process for club physicians to document
expected player recovery time with the following provision: “[a]ll determinations of recovery time for major and minor injuries must be by the Club’s
medical staff and in accordance with the Club’s medical standards. . .The
prognosis of the player’s recovery time should be as precise as possible.”156
The 1982 CBA imposed other requirements on clubs regarding chemical
abuse and dependency by including a provision that “[t]he Club physician
may, upon reasonable cause, direct a player. . .for testing for chemical abuse
or dependency problems.”157
The retired players may again argue, as Judge Kozinski of the Ninth
Circuit concluded, that the CBAs exempt the NFL because “the league is not
a signatory on six of the seven [CBAs].”158 “Judge Kozinski compared the
NFL to a random third party, such as a player’s wife who instructs a team
doctor to give her husband more pain medication.”159 The players allege that
the NFL doctors and trainers, not the doctors and trainers of individual teams,
gave players medications without telling them what they were taking. Therefore, because the CBA only address the duties of the individual clubs and not
the NFL itself, the plaintiffs will continue to argue that their claims do not
arise from the CBA, nor do they require interpretation from the CBA. However, regardless of whether or not the NFL is a signatory to the contracts, the
league is still heavily involved in the agreements, unlike a player’s wife, and
is not just “a random third party.” As a result, the CBA should not exempt

154. Id. at 1126.
155. Duerson, 2012 WL 1658353, at *5.
156. Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014 WL 7205048, at *4–5
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014).
157. Id. at *4.
158. Morgan Francy, An Open Field for Professional Athlete Litigation: An Analysis of the
Current Application of Section 301 Preemption in Professional Sports Lawsuits, 70 SMU L. REV.
475, 490 (2017) (citation omitted).
159. Id.
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the NFL and the players’ claims do arise from the CBA. Additionally, as
discussed before, the court in Stringer found that “[d]efendants’ status as
non-signatories to the CBA does not prevent them from raising the preemption defense.”160 For these reasons, the fact that the NFL is not a signatory
to several of the CBAs does not stop it from using this defense.161
The players’ and Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that the CBA provisions
governing players’ right to medical care is “irrelevant to the question of
whether the NFL’s conduct violated federal laws regarding the distribution
of controlled substances”162 is incorrect. There are several provisions in the
CBAs that address these issues. For example, the 1993 CBA imposed a right
to medical care for injuries and placed the scope of such care in the hands of
club physicians.163 The 2006 CBA provided that each club will have a boardcertified orthopedic surgeon as one of its Club physicians,164 and the 2011
CBA expanded on this by requiring all other physicians to be board-certified
in their field of expertise.165 In addition, the 2011 CBA clarified that “club
physicians must comply with all federal, state, and local requirements, including all ethical standards established by any applicable government
and/or other authority that regulates the medical profession.”166
Additionally, if the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation prevails and the players’ claims are not preempted solely because the CBA addresses the duties
of the individual teams rather than the NFL, it would show that “the NFL
could reasonably rely on the [individual teams] to notice and diagnose player

160. Stringer v. Nat’l Football League, 474 F. Supp. 2d 894, 902 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
161. Article 2, Section 1 of the 2011 CBA states that “[f]or the avoidance of doubt, the
NFL shall be considered a signatory to this Agreement.” However, this provision is not included
in previous CBAs.
162. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1126.
163. Dent, 2014 WL 7205048, at *5.
164. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the NFL Management Council and the
NFL Players Association, NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION 1, 197 (Aug. 4, 2011),
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/2011%20CBA%20Updated%20with%20Side%20Letters%20thru%201-5-15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8UXP-PK8K].
165. Dent, 2014 WL 7205048, at *6.
166. Id.
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health problems arising from playing in the NFL.”167 The NFL could then
exercise a lower standard of care, potentially leading to more problems regarding the health and safety of players. Therefore, determining the meaning
of the CBA provisions is necessary to resolving these claims.
It is evident that the NFL has produced multiple provisions from the
CBA that explicitly address player health and safety and “address in detail
issues relating to assessment, diagnosis, and treatment of player injuries.”168
These player health and safety provisions place responsibility on team doctors, through the NFL, “to determine a player’s physical condition and recovery time; medical and hospital care for the player after suffering an injury
while performing services under the contract; team requirements for boardcertified orthopedic surgeons; trainer certification by the National Athletic
Trainers Association; and additional doctors and an ambulance on site during
games.”169
Because the players’ claims are relevant and related to several provisions in the CBA, the court would have to consider the protections in the
prior paragraph that the NFL has imposed on clubs through collective bargaining. Therefore, the players’ claims arise from the CBA. If the claims
arise from the CBA, the claim is preempted, and the analysis stops here.170
However, even if the Ninth Circuit correctly determined that the plaintiffs’
claims did not arise from the CBA, still, it erroneously concluded that they
would not require the interpretation of the CBA.

b. Even if the Players’ Claims Did Not Arise from the CBA, They
Would Still Require the Interpretation of the CBAs
If the players’ claims do not arise from the CBA, then the second question is whether the claims require interpretation from the CBA. Even if the
players’ claims arose from common law or state law rather than the CBA,
the claims would still be preempted under the second step of the test because
they require interpretation of the CBA. The situation in Dent is similar to
the situation in Stringer, in that the court was faced with determining whether
167. Duerson v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., No. 12 C 2513, 2012 WL 1658353, at *11
(N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012).
168. Kelly A. Heard, The Impact of Preemption in the NFL Concussion Litigation, 68 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 221, 235 (2013).
169. Id.
170. Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059.
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the plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim was based solely on common law tort
principles, or if they needed the interpretation of the CBA to be resolved.171
The court concluded that the plaintiff’s wrongful death claim was preempted
by section 301 of the LMRA because “resolution of that claim is substantially dependent on, and inextricably intertwined with, an analysis of certain
provisions of the CBA.”172 Here, it would also be necessary to interpret the
provisions in the CBA to determine whether the plaintiffs can continue with
their claims.
One instance in Dent where the plaintiffs’ claim requires interpretation
of the CBA is when the plaintiffs allege that the NFL itself is the cause of
the plaintiffs’ problems, not individual teams.173 For example, they claim
that NFL doctors and trainers gave players medications without advising
them on what they were taking.174 However, the NFL has clearly addressed
the problem of medical care in the CBAs. For example, the 1993 CBA imposed a right to medical care for injuries and placed the scope of that care in
the hands of team doctors.175
In Williams, the court found that “the question of whether the Players
can show that they reasonably relied on the lack of a warning that [the dietary
supplements] contained bumetanide cannot be ascertained apart from the
terms of the policy, specifically section eight, entitled ‘Masking Agents and
Supplements’ and Appendix G, entitled ‘Supplements.’”176 Similar to this
situation in Williams, here it would be necessary to interpret the CBA provisions on the disclosure of medical information to determine whether plaintiffs reasonably relied on the alleged lack of proper disclosure by the NFL.
This example follows the two-step test for section 301 preemption.
Even if this state-law tort claim does not directly arise from the CBA, it nevertheless requires the interpretation of the CBA because the CBA includes
provisions that address the claims. Because the plaintiffs’ claims either arise
from the CBA, or the CBA can be used to interpret the claims, the plaintiffs’

171. Stringer, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 901.
172. Id. at 911.
173. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1118.
174. Id. at 1115.
175. Dent, 2014 WL 7205048, at *5.
176. Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 882 (8th Cir. 2009).
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claims should be preempted under section 301, and the Ninth Circuit erred
in reversing the trial court’s decision.

2. The Ninth Circuit’s Holding that the Plaintiff’s Claims are not
Preempted Under Section 301 Interferes with the Uniformity of
Interpretation of Collective Bargaining Agreements
For the players to argue that the NFL has not addressed issues involving
their health and safety in any of the CBAs is unfair to not only the league,
but to other employers who also heavily rely on collective bargaining. As
mentioned in Section II, Congress’s purpose for passing the LMRA was “to
prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their relations . . . [and] to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce.”177 In addition, the purpose of section 301 preemption is to encourage “uniformity of
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements and prevention of interference with those agreements.”178 Without either of these, collective bargaining serves no legitimate purpose.179 “To address threats to the federal
labor-contract scheme, the Supreme Court has fashioned the [section] 301
preemption rule such that if state law attempts to define the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, federal labor law preempts that state-law
claim.”180
With the Ninth Circuit’s holding, the uniformity of interpretation of
CBAs is greatly affected, because after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, procedures
in the CBAs will be interfered with and plaintiffs will be encouraged to go
around the CBA. Similar to the situation in Williams, where the court ruled
that some of the players’ claims were not preempted by section 301, here the
Ninth Circuit’s decision that the plaintiff’s claims are not preempted by section 301 “threatens the competitive balance by which the NFL is characterized, and–on a larger scale–strips employers of their power to collectively
bargain with employees[,]”181 because it leaves employers who rely on a
177. Francy, supra note 158, at 479.
178. Id.
179. Heard, supra note 168, at 227.
180. Id.
181. Jaime Koziol, Touchdown for the Union: Why the NFL Needs an Instant Replay in
Williams v. NFL, 9 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 137, 138–39 (2010).
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CBA such as the NFL vulnerable, “with no outlet to ensure its policies are
uniformly enforced at all levels and locations.”182
The purpose of the provisions in a CBA are to “enforce a single, uniform standard of player conduct to ensure an even playing field for all players.”183 Allowing the retired players’ claims in Dent to be heard is unjust to
players from states whose statutes would not protect them. Consequently,
the NFL will have a hard time enforcing policies in a CBA in future situations similar to Dent because players will attempt to follow their respective
states’ statutes instead. If the Supreme Court upholds the Ninth Circuit’s
ruling, the holding in Dent may extend beyond the NFL to employers outside
of professional sports leagues who rely on a CBA in their negotiations. With
the Ninth Circuit’s decision to disregard the provisions in the CBA, employers from all over the country will now be forced to consult every state’s
workplace laws where they have employees, along with all other applicable
statutes, when negotiating their policies.184 This will leave employers frustrated and feeling as if they are denied their power to negotiate.185 For this
reason, it would be more equitable for not only the league, but also for other
employers and the NFL’s other players, if the Ninth Circuit’s decision was
overturned.

B. Possible Solution for Players
Assuming the Supreme Court overturns the Ninth Circuit’s decision
and rules in favor of the NFL, the players can then follow the provisions that
are set out in the CBA and file grievances to be settled through arbitration.
Not only does the Ninth Circuit’s decision make employers feel as if their
power to negotiate with employees has been stripped, but it also downplays
the importance of arbitration, which is “the most widely used dispute resolution mechanism in unionized industries.”186 Any given CBA set forth the
procedures for initiating and filing a grievance. For example, Article 15 of

182. Id. at 160.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 161.
185. Id.
186. Jeffrey D. Meyer, The NFLPA’s Arbitration Procedure: A Forum for Professional
Football Players and Their Agents to Resolve Disputes, 6 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 107, 107
(1990).
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the 2011 CBA states that “[t]he System Arbitrator shall make findings of fact
and determinations of relief including, without limitation, damages…injunctive relief, fines, and specific performance.”187
In addition, “arbitrators have liberally construed [the] statute of limitations by allowing many complaints to proceed through the system regardless
of the time of occurrence and filing.”188 In negotiating these provisions, it is
clear that the NFL’s representatives and the NFLPA intended for disputes to
be handled through arbitration. If the Supreme Court does not overturn the
Ninth Circuit’s decision, employers who negotiated a CBA are left questioning the effectiveness of including an arbitration clause.
An example of a grievance that has recently gone through the NFL’s
arbitration process involves current free-agent quarterback Colin Kaepernick.189 Kaepernick filed a grievance under the 2011 CBA against NFL owners for collusion, claiming that the NFL and its owners “have colluded to
deprive Mr. Kaepernick of employment rights . . . .”190 In August of 2018,
the arbitrator hearing Kaepernick’s case ruled against the league after the
NFL moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that Kaepernick and his legal
team had not presented sufficient evidence to proceed.191 This meant that
Kaepernick was able to continue with his collusion grievance and proceed to
a hearing with the arbitrator.192 In February of 2019, however, Kaepernick instead reached a settlement with the NFL.193
Arbitration is especially valuable and must be respected in professional
sports due to the “availability of a timely resolution, the ability of parties to
187. NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 164, at 116.
188. Meyer, supra note 186, at 115.
189. See generally QB Colin Kaepernick Files Grievance for Collusion Against NFL Owners, ESPN (Oct. 16, 2017), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/21035352/colin-kaepernick-filesgrievance-nfl-owners-collusion [https://perma.cc/7E7C-37VP].
190. Id.
191. Ryan Nanni, The NFL was Denied a Summary Judgment Against Colin Kaepernick.
Here’s What That Means, SB NATION (Aug. 30, 2018, 6:17 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2018/8/30/17801870/colin-kaepernick-nfl-collusion-lawsuit-summary-judgement
[http://perma.cc/52MV-WVC8].
192. Id.
193. Kevin Seifert, Colin Kaepernick, Eric Reid Settle Grievances Against NFL, ESPN
(Feb. 16, 2019), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/26004715/colin-kaepernick-eric-reid-settlegrievance-case-nfl [https://perma.cc/FMS6-KXCW].
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rely on the finality of the decision, and the arbitrator’s specialized knowledge
of league rules and customs.”194 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly encouraged courts to respect and refer to arbitration decisions.195 This
process may initially seem unfair to the plaintiffs in Dent, because although
NFL owners, coaches and executives will likely face more intense questioning and cross-examinations from the arbitrator,196 there will be less public
exposure due to the private nature of arbitrations.197 However, these procedures merely follow what the players and the NFL’s Management Council
agreed upon in a CBA.

V. CONCLUSION
Football is a rough, and at times, dangerous sport. NFL players work
long hours, put their bodies through a great deal of stress and harm, and are
at risk for serious career and life-threatening injuries. For example, recent
studies have shown that playing professional football may increase the risk
of neurological problems, premature death, and suffering from brain disease.198 Given the intensity of their workloads and the stress they put on their
bodies and minds on a daily basis, it is only natural that NFL players are
concerned about the steps taken to address their health and safety. The NFL
should, and does, address these concerns by imposing duties on individual
teams through the CBA, the provisions of which address the plaintiffs’
claims in Dent.
This is precisely why the state-law claims brought against the NFL by
former professional football players in Dent should be preempted by section
301 of the LMRA. The Ninth Circuit’s decision to allow the players’ case
to proceed may leave employers, such as the NFL, with no way to ensure
194. Koziol, supra note 181, at 162.
195. See generally Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
196. Jon Becker, Win for Kaepernick: Arbitrator Sends His Collusion Case Against NFL
to Full Hearing, MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 31, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/08/30/arbitrator-agrees-with-kaepernick-his-case-against-nfl-going-to-trial/
[https://perma.cc/8NT8-YY4Q].
197. Francy, supra note 158, at 478.
198. See generally Karen Weintraub, NFL Players Could Have a Higher Risk of Death and
Brain Disease, Study Indicates, USA TODAY (Feb. 1, 2018, 3:20 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/02/01/nfl-players-could-have-higher-risk-death-and-brain-disease-study-indicates/1087352001/ [https://perma.cc/7U7G-WWHK].
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that the provisions collectively agreed upon in the CBA are enforced. This
ultimately will interfere with the uniformity of interpretation of any given
CBA. Resolution of this preemption question may not only determine the
future of provisions in CBAs in professional football, but also may impact
the future of collective bargaining provisions in professional sports overall.
The Supreme Court should overturn the Ninth Circuit’s decision to ensure
that the procedures set forth in the NFL’s current (and future) CBA are carefully followed.

